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Abstract I distinguish between naïve phenomenology and really existing phenom-
enology, a distinction that is too often ignored. As a consequence, the weaknesses
inherent in naïve phenomenology are mistakenly attributed to phenomenology. I
argue that the critics of naïve phenomenology have unwittingly adopted a number of
precisely those weaknesses they wish to point out. More precisely, I shall argue that
Dennett’s criticism of the naïve or auto-phenomenological conception of subjectivity
fails to provide a better understanding of the intended phenomenon.
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Naïve phenomenology
Consider a philosophical position, naïve phenomenology, described by the following
set of claims.
Consciousness is subjective. It involves the first-person point of view. Because
consciousness is subjective it cannot be studied from an objective, scientific and
third-person point of view. Standard empirical science has no access to conscious
experience. A proper study of consciousness requires a special methodology, one
that studies consciousness from within, from the very subjective point of view from
which it is experienced.
Knowledge in the first person about consciousness is based on introspection.
Introspection is not accessible in the third-person and one is obliged to acknowledge
an epistemic asymmetry between the first and the third-person. Whatever you may
know about my conscious experience, my beliefs about such experience have
authority over yours. In fact, introspective beliefs about seemings are infallible:
however things actually are, I cannot be wrong about how they appear to me.
Conscious experiences are seemings. To have a colour experience means to
experience how things visually appear to one. To sense pain means to have an
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experience of something appearing painful. There is no such thing as an experience of
pain appearing painless. For something to be painful is not one among various ways a
pain manifests itself, it is the experience of pain itself.
In so far as they are seemings, experiences are essentially qualitative, phenomenal.
There is something ‘it is like’ to have an experience. This is not true for many other
things that happen to us: there is nothing it is like to have one’s own blood circulating
through the brain, or one’s backbone producing leucocytes, although our conscious
life causally depends on those things happening and although preventing those things
from happening would doubtless cause a whole series of conscious experiences.
The qualitative, phenomenal character of experience, its what-it-is-likeness, its
‘seeming-like’ character, presuppose the very possibility of a subjective view: for
something to appear in a certain way, there must be a subject to whom things appear
in that way; for an experience to deliver a certain way it is like to have it, a subject
must exist for whom there is a way it is like to have that experience.
Finally, conscious experiences are subjective as they contain motivational and
normative power. In so far as my action is conscious and intentional, it is controlled by
subjective beliefs and desires: because I believe that I am responsible for the mess in the
supermarket and that causing the mess was unintentional, I consequently stopmy trolley
and clear up the sugar I have been spilling all over the place. And it is in so far as I feel
obliged to do the thing I am doing, that I can be said to behave according to certain rules.
Naïve phenomenology and really existing phenomenology
Naïve phenomenology, as I have described it so far, requires further elaboration. One
may enquire whether the set of views presented under its heading yields a coherent
philosophical position. It would be preposterous to attribute naïve phenomenology to
Edmund Husserl, the founder of really existing phenomenology.
Consider, for instance, introspection. Husserl certainly thought, together with his
teachers Wilhelm Wundt and Franz Brentano, that introspection plays a crucial role in
our conception of what it means for something to be a conscious experience.1 This idea
may reasonably be taken to imply that our canonical concept of imagination, say, is
essentially related to the notion of one being able to know that one is imagining on the
basis of mere introspection.2 Such a claim requires nothing else from introspection
1 Cf. Wundt (1888: 304) and Brentano (1924: 128–29). In Ideas I Husserl writes: “It is evident that [...]
consciousness and the content of consciousness are recognisable [erkennbar] only through [...] acts of
reflection” (Husserl, 1913: 156–57). This passage leaves open the question as to whether one is able to
acquire knowledge about consciousness only introspectively, or whether something qualifies as a
conscious experience only if it can be accessed introspectively. Unless Husserl can be shown to require the
first, much stronger reading, one should opt for the second.
2 Many additional details would be needed in order to spell out the full nature of this requirement. For
instance: what are the relations between the canonical definition given above and the possession
conditions of one of the concepts under consideration? For a subject to possess a psychological concept is
it necessary that he himself be able to apply it introspectively? One may wish to be liberal and to allow a
subject to rely on somebody else’s competence. Indeed, in the heyday of introspective psychology the
application of specific psychological concepts was often thought to presuppose training and great
concentration. That everybody should attain such a level of sophistication was not necessary. The
linguistic division of labour was applied to psychological concepts.
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other than the fact that one can come to know that one imagines in a way one cannot
come to know e.g., that one’s blood is circulating in one’s brain. Given the way we use
it, our concept of blood circulating in our brain is not the concept of a conscious
experience. This alone is far from committing us to the view that introspection
provides a foundation for infallible knowledge or that introspection delivers the unique
epistemic route to the study of consciousness.
Husserl surely believed it possible to acquire introspective knowledge of one’s
own conscious experiences. There is no reason, however, to suppose he took
introspection to be infallible. No later than in the first edition of the Logical
Investigations, Husserl objected to his teacher Brentano, who had argued that inner
perception is infallible (“evident,” as he put it), that inner and outer perceptions have
“the same epistemological character” (Husserl, 1901: 703). “There is,” he argues,
“an acceptable distinction between evident and non-evident, between non-deceptive
and deceptive perception [...], yet this distinction does not coincide with the former”
(Husserl, 1901: 704). Indeed, Husserl thinks that “it is clear that most perceptions of
mental states cannot be evident” (Husserl, 1901). In a previous passage of the same
book he argued that “perception directed onto one’s own experiences [...] in no way
needs to be adequate” (Husserl, 1901: 333), where adequacy is a quality a perception
earns when “it presents the object [...] such as it is.”3
Husserl’s later conception of the role and status of introspection is heavily
influenced by his adoption of transcendental philosophy. In Ideas I Husserl discusses
at length the relation between phenomenology and “inner observation,” concluding
that one has to separate the difficulties related to the use of introspection in empirical
psychology from those related to its function in phenomenology (cf. Husserl, 1913:
152 ff). Husserl is clearly aware that, from an empirical point of view, introspection
cannot offer anything more than any other kind of inductive evidence. He thus argues
that phenomenology does not use introspection as a form of evidence at all. In Ideas
III he writes that “he who believes that whatever is accomplished by phenomenology
has already been achieved in psychology by means of inner experience, speaks as
wisely as he who maintains that one can obtain through physical observation [...]
whatever the geometer may be able to offer to the physicist” (Husserl, 1971: 44).
Husserl’s real point about the philosophical study of consciousness, no less than the
philosophical study of anything is that, in such a study, no result should depend on any
existential presupposition, whatever empirical basis the latter may have. There are at
least two ideas at the root of this well-known doctrine. To begin with, there is the idea
that a philosophical inquiry should aim at obtaining results concerning the specific
essence of the items under scrutiny rather than the contingent conditions of their
existence. In Ideas I Husserl writes that “a phenomenological doctrine of essences has
as little need to be affected by the methods the phenomenologist would use in order to
secure the existence of the experiences that provide the backing of his claims as
geometry has to be concerned with the method that would secure the existence of the
figures on the blackboard or the models in the cupboard” (Husserl, 1913: 153).
3 It ought to be mentioned here that Brentano explicitly admitted the possibility for a subject to have false
beliefs about her own experiences. Husserl’s criticism fails to do full justice to this point in Brentano’s
theory. For more on Brentano’s view see Soldati (2005).
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Whatever metaphysical status essences might finally be said to have4, in Husserl’s view
it is clear that those sciences concerned with essences (“eidetic sciences,” as he called
them), such as arithmetic, geometry, logic, and precisely philosophy, generate results
that cannot be justified by appeal to empirical evidence (cf. Husserl, 1913: 20–21). This
does not mean that experiences do not play an important role in our grasping of eidetic
truths. Indeed, just as computer simulations can play a role in our understanding of the
nature of multidimensional space, exercises in imagination may help us to better
understand the concepts used in a philosophical theory of imagination.
In spite of its eidetic nature, the phenomenological study of consciousness should not
be put on a par with formal sciences such as mathematical analysis or formal logic.
“Transcendental phenomenology as a descriptive science of essences,” Husserl says,
“belongs to an entirely different set of eidetic sciences than the mathematical sciences”
(Husserl, 1913: 142). The central reason behind this latter claim is that descriptive
sciences, to which phenomenology is said to belong in spite of its transcendental
approach, contain vague concepts that cannot reach the status of the “exact” concepts
one finds in formal sciences. Whereas the exactness of such concepts are said to
enable formal sciences to rely on deductive justification, descriptive eidetic sciences
are required to search for other forms of priori warrant.5
Furthermore, there is the idea that philosophy is ultimately concernedwith the disclosure
of normative connections and that, in this respect, no empirical basis can suffice. Like Kant,
Husserl is at pains to distinguish this suggestion from the more traditional claim that
philosophy ought to establish necessary truths and that empirical findings suffice to
establish exclusively contingent truths. Hence, for example, Husserl would argue that a
philosophical theory of intentional consciousness aims at clarifying the relation between
experience and content in a way that determines the features an experience must have in
order to be poised for the acquisition of knowledge. Which features of a judgement, for
instance, are required for such experience to convey access to a truth-valuable content? Can
a perceptual experience, given its nature, satisfy these requirements? 6
This is obviously not the place to defend Husserl’s conception of philosophy,
containing, as it does, many aspects ranging from the very idea of philosophy as a
discipline delivering a priori justification to the metaphysical doctrine of essences. It is
also clear that, unlike a number of other influential philosophers of the twentieth
century, Husserl did not question the very possibility of introspective knowledge.
There are, however, pervasive systematic reasons in Husserlian phenomenology that
4 The relevant question here concerns the relation between essences and other types of entities. Husserl
appears to have thought that the answer to this question must take into consideration the different
ontological regions into which reality divides. The relation between the number two and a heap of two
apples is not the same as the relation between the essence of an intentional act and an occurring
perception. Essences, one may wish to say, do not manifest themselves in the same way in all regions of
reality.
5 Husserl’s inquiries into the nature of “categorial intuition” and Wesensschau are partially born out of this
need.
6 Useless to say that more would be needed in order to secure Husserl’s claim that the issues at stake are
indeed normative. As it has often been noticed, there is a very weak form of ‘ought’ in the claim that an
experience ought to be such and such in order to be poised for the grasp of truth-conditions. Husserl was
aware of this, and he explicitly dealt with the different kinds of ought on different occasions (for instance
in the Prolegonema to the Logical Investigations).
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warn against considering introspective knowledge as enjoying a privileged position
over and against any other form of empirical knowledge. From a phenomenological
point of view the issue does not so much concern the question of what one can learn
about consciousness on the basis of an introspective inquiry, but rather the results one
may obtain by a philosophical reflection on concepts typically applied in the first-
person on the basis of introspection. The presumption that philosophical inquiry
itself ought to rest on introspective evidence would be seriously flawed.
Similar considerations apply to other facets of naïve phenomenology. It is, indeed,
daunting to observe that the distinction between naïve phenomenology and really existing
phenomenology is all too often ignored. As a consequence, the weaknesses inherent in
naïve phenomenology are, as such, attributed to phenomenology. To show the various
ways in which real existing phenomenology ought to be distinguished from naïve
phenomenologywould go beyond the limits of this paper. The task I have set myself in the
following has a more modest objective. I argue that the critics of naïve phenomenology
have unwittingly adopted a number of precisely those weaknesses they wish to point out.
More precisely, I shall argue that Dennett’s criticism of the naïve or auto-phenomeno-
logical conception of subjectivity fails to provide a better understanding of the intended
phenomenon.
Subjectivity and consciousness
Experiences, the naïve phenomenologist argues, are subjective. Daniel Dennett has
repeatedly submitted that heterophenomenology, the scientific, third personal,
objective alternative to ‘autophenomenology,’ is “the sound way to take the first-
person point of view as seriously as it can be taken” (Dennett, 2003: 1). He writes:
[...] I described a method, heterophenomenology, which was explicitly designed to
be “the path leading from objective physical science and its insistence on the
third-person point of view, to a method of phenomenological description that can
(in principle) do justice to the most private and ineffable subjective experiences,
while never abandoning the methodological principles of science” (Dennett, 2001
quoting Dennett, 1991: 72).
A full understanding of Dennett’s proposal presupposes a precise grasp of what he
means when he says that experiences are subjective. This can only be a first, albeit
important step in the evaluation of the heterophenomenologist’s ambition to do
justice to “the most private and ineffable subjective experiences.”
In discussing David Chalmers views, Daniel Dennett makes the following claim:
I don’t stipulate at the beginning of the day that our subjective beliefs about our
first-person experiences are “phenomenological” beliefs in a sense that requires
them somehow to depend on (but not causally depend on) experiences that
zombies don’t have! I just stipulate that the contents of those beliefs exhaustively
constitute each person’s (or zombie’s) subjectivity. (Dennett, 2001)7
7 See also: “You reserve judgment about whether the subject’s beliefs, as expressed in their
communication, are true, or even well-grounded, but then you treat them as constitutive of that subject’s
subjectivity” (Dennett, 2003: 4).
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Following this stipulation, the subjectivity of an experience would be constituted
by the beliefs the subject has about it.
As a mere stipulation, the claim under scrutiny is tantalizing. One may indeed
wonder whether it is a consequence of a general metaphysical doctrine. Such a
doctrine, ‘radical idealism,’ would encompass the claim that the phenomenon of
electricity, say, is exhaustively constituted by the content of one’s (whose?) beliefs
about electricity. Although not unheard of, the position is radical. Yet apart from its
radicalism, the position would not help to explain why conscious experiences, as
opposed to electricity, are subjective. One ought to assume that Dennett’s stipulation
does not stem from radical idealism. The stipulation has to be motivated by specific
considerations pertaining either to the nature of experiences or to the status of beliefs
about them or to some feature concerning the relation between them. Let us then
look more precisely at these different possibilities.
Joseph Levine has remarked that a theory about conscious experience ought to
take “the conscious experiences themselves, not merely our verbal judgments about
them as the primary data to which a theory must answer” (Levine, 1994, quoted in
Dennett, 2001 and in Dennett, 2003). The requirement sounds reasonable: it is
analogous to the complaint that a theory about electricity should not take beliefs
about it as its primary data. Similarly, Alvin Goldman contends that when a
blindsighted subject reports that he does not see the thing in front of him, it is the
fact that he does not see the thing that interests the cognitive scientist, not the fact
that the subject believes that he does not see it (Goldman quoted by Dennett, 2001).
Yet Dennett does not agree. Beliefs about one’s experiences, he thinks, can be
both positive and false negative. I can attribute to myself an experience I have not
had and I can fail to attribute an experience I have. Given this fact, Dennett argues,
one should not take the subject’s reports at face value. One should remain neutral
about the truth of the subject’s beliefs and, instead, opt for an explanation of their
very occurrence. What needs to be explained, Dennett urges, is not the experience
but the beliefs about the experience.
It has been noticed (cf. Goldman’s reply in Dennett, 2001) that it would be odd to
conclude that one should refrain from taking first-person beliefs at face value based
on the fact that they happen to be false. Our knowledge of the external world is
largely based on perception, which is known to generate experiences that are both
false positive and false negative. Yet one does not consider the fact that perception is
fallible as a ground for remaining neutral with respect to what it delivers. So why
should our attitude be any different with respect to introspective first-person beliefs?
Dennett’s point might be less epistemological than metaphysical. He might be
insisting on the independence of a belief concerning one’s experience from the
experience itself. Discussing well-known results with respect to masked semantic
priming, Dennett considers the possibility of a theory determining whether subjects
are, in fact, conscious of the priming stimulus, but then forget it as a consequence of
the mask. Dennett argues that when subjects are taught the theory they “would learn
for the first time that they were, or were not, conscious of those stimuli” (Dennett,
2003: 9). This would show that it is possible for a subject to have a conscious
experience and yet not to believe, not even be disposed to believe that she does. If
conscious experiences are seemings, as the naïve phenomenologist would have it,
then it ought to be possible that something seems to a subject in a certain way
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although the subject does not believe it and vice versa. Although something seems F
to the subject, the subject might not believe that something seems F to her and
although the subject believes that something seems F to her, nothing might in fact
seem F to her. Stated in this way the claim is purely metaphysical: it says nothing
about the trust-worthiness of first-person beliefs.
It sounds at times as if the result obtained above would stand at odds with some
other things Dennett has been saying, and has repeatedly quoted himself as saying:
You are not authoritative about what is happening in you, but only about what seems
to be happening in you, and we are giving you total, dictatorial authority over the
account of how it seems to you [...]. (Dennett, 1991: 96–97; Dennett, 2003: 4).
If experiences are seemings, then what is said in this quotation would imply that
the subject has privileged epistemic access to his own experiences. The quotation
would rule out the possibility of one having such a privilege with respect to other
things happening ‘in’ the subject, such as the circulating of blood in one’s brain.
This, we saw, is precisely the naïve phenomenologist’s view.
There is an obvious danger of a terminological confusion at this stage. Consider the
debate about mental imagery. Subjects typically report that they rotate the object in their
imagination. Pylyshyn and others have argued that there are competing alternatives
about the subject’s actual cognitive performance. Suppose the subject utters:
(1) It seems to me that I am rotating the object in imagination.
Should we consider the subject to be authoritative with respect to what is stated
with utterance (1)? It all depends on how ‘it seems to me that...’ is interpreted. At least
two possibilities are available. Utterance (1) might be taken to be equivalent either to:
(1a) I have the experience of rotating the object in imagination,
or to:
(1b) I believe that I am rotating the object in imagination.
This latter interpretation is warranted by locutions such as ‘it seems to me that the
Olympics will take place in London’ or ‘it seems to me that Brutus killed Caesar in
Rome in front of the theatre,’ where readings along (1b) are preferred to readings
along (1a).
If we grant, following Dennett’s appeal, the possibility that the subject mistakenly
reports to be rotating the object in imagination, then (1a) might be false. The subject
cannot be granted any special authority over it.
Utterance (1b) itself can be read in different ways. On one possible reading, it
simply reinforces the belief the subject would have expressed by uttering ‘I am
rotating the object in imagination.’ In that case, where (1b) expresses a belief, the
subject might indeed be said to have authority over it, in the specific sense that,
given (1b), and supposing that the subject is sincere and not simulating, it makes no
sense to doubt that the subject really has the belief she is expressing, the belief that
she is rotating an object in imagination.
This view ultimately boils down to the classical distinction between describing
and expressing. The point could have been formulated without any appeal to
‘seeming’ at all. It would suffice to state that when the subject utters ‘I am rotating
the object in imagination’ she describes her experience and expresses her belief. The
subject has no authority over what she describes, but she has authority, a special kind
of authority, over what she expresses. It ought to be pointed out that if the former
Subjectivity in heterophenomenology 95
kind of authority, the one we are asked to sacrifice, would have had real epistemic
import, the epistemic status of the second one, the one that is retained, is much more
doubtful. Indeed, where it is clear that one can come to know something by
describing it, it is much less obvious that one can come to know something by
expressing it.8 Independently of this issue, however, the expressing relation does not
concern the independence claim under consideration: even if the subject were
granted authority over what he expresses, the beliefs describing the experience could
still be independent of the latter.
I said that (1b) could be read in at least one other way. It may be read as a
description not of the original experience, but of a belief about it. Utterance (1)
would then be the expression of the subject’s second order belief that she believes –
first order – to have the experience of rotating an object in imagination. At this stage
the argument might be that the subject is endowed with ‘dictatorial authority’ over
that sort of first order belief, as opposed to her own experience. We would be asked
to grant the subject infallible knowledge about her own beliefs, as opposed to her
knowledge about her own experiences. The claim would merit further discussion
since it appears to presuppose an important distinction between experiences and
beliefs (does it not seem to me that I believe that all men are equal in front of the
law?). For the issue at stake, however, the question is irrelevant. Again, the
independence claim under consideration concerns the relation between experience
and first order belief, not between first order and second order belief. With respect to
the issue at stake, then, Dennett’s ‘dictatorial authority’ would be once more
irrelevant.
Thus, so far, little if anything has been shown that conflicts with Dennett’s
approval of the independence claim. With respect to subjectivity, the independence
claim generates the following alternative: either an experience is subjective,
independent of whether or not there is a belief about it, or it is not. If it is, then
the constitution claim must go: if an experience is subjective independent of what
the subject believes about it, then its subjectivity cannot be the result of the subject
having a belief about it. But then one cannot maintain that the subjectivity of
experiences can be reduced to, or be fully accounted for in terms of, the subject’s
beliefs about them.
If, on the other hand, one endeavors to save the constitution claim, if one wishes
to maintain that an experience is not subjective unless there is a belief about it, then
the independence claim can only be satisfied at the price of letting subjectivity be a
variable feature of experience. Subjective, then, are those experiences that are only
the object of a belief. An immediate objection would insist on the fact that if not by
virtue of being objects of beliefs, experiences are subjective by virtue of some other,
possibly intrinsic feature, such as the fact that they are seemings. Let us ignore this
objection for the moment – it will reappear later. Let us assume that subjectivity is a
feature some experiences acquire by virtue of there being a belief about them. The
question must still be answered as to which features of those beliefs, or of the
experiences the beliefs are about, are responsible for the attribution of subjectivity.
As we have already seen, states of affairs in general do not become subjective
8 It ought to be noted here that Brentano’s famous notion of inner perception comes close to the idea that
there is ‘knowledge by expression.’ See Soldati (2005).
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merely by virtue of the subject having a belief about them. Additional restrictions are
needed.
One first restriction would concern the states of affairs the belief is about.
Subjectivity, one might argue, emerges when the belief is about a state of affairs that
contains the subject, or depends metaphysically on the subject. So, my belief that the
stone falls does not make the stone’s fall subjective, but my belief that I have a pain
makes my pain subjective in so far as I, as a subject, am part of the state of affairs
that contains pain. This view presupposes that one can determine what a subject is
independently of one’s account of what makes an experience subjective. It might be
felt that this puts too much of a burden on a possible theory concerning the status of
subjects. There is another reason, however, that makes the view even more
unpalatable. This is because it allows for an experience to be subjective merely by
virtue of there being somebody having a belief about it. Your pain would become
subjective by virtue of me having a belief about it. In order to prevent such an odd
conclusion, a second restriction would require that the subject be both constituent of
the state of affairs and believer. My pain is subjective because I have a belief about
it. This is better, but not fully convincing. Consider, for instance, the subject’s first
personal belief that she herself weights 60 kg. Both restrictions are satisfied but is
one prepared to say that the subject’s weight constitutes a subjective state of affairs?
This last conclusion could, of course, be avoided if one were ready to accept the
idea that a state being subjective depends on some of its non-physical intrinsic
properties. One might thus require that the state of affairs the subject has a belief about
contain both the subject himself and one of his mental properties. The subject’s belief
should concern his own mental states. At this stage, the questions we neglected earlier
become pressing. If a state can be mental before its bearer has a belief about it, why
then can’t it be subjective under those same conditions? And if a state about which a
subject has a belief is not subjective unless it is mental, why is it the subject’s belief
about it, rather than its intrinsic mentality, that makes it subjective?
What, however, would be the consequences of not adopting this last requirement?
What if one were prepared to say that any state of affairs containing the subject
becomes subjective as soon as the subject himself has a belief about it? It appears
that one would then severe the connection between consciousness and subjectivity
so much that not only would there be non-subjective experiences – because there is
no belief about them – but also subjective states of affairs that are not conscious
experiences. Arguments might be found that speak in favor of such a radically anti-
Cartesian move. It is doubtful, however, that such arguments can be made available
to Dennett’s line of thought. For an account of subjectivity would then fall short of
providing any specific information about the nature of conscious experiences. The
study of subjectivity would be independent of the study of consciousness. And so
neither auto-, nor hetero-, nor naïve phenomenology would be particularly suited for
an understanding of subjectivity.
Naïve phenomenology and heterophenomenology
Although it contains claims that merit elaboration, naïve phenomenology as such
does not really warrant refutation. By criticizing naïve phenomenology one rather
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faces the danger of inheriting some of its weaknesses. One such weakness lies in the
way naïve phenomenology establishes the relation between consciousness and
subjectivity. We are led to think that conscious experiences are subjective in so far as
the subject has a privileged epistemic access to them. When asked to specify the
intended privilege, the naïve phenomenologist typically appeals to introspection and
to its putative infallibility. Once the claim of infallibility has been shown not to hold,
the privilege disappears and the subjectivity of the experience remains unaccounted
for.
Dennett’s heterophenomenologist rejects the infallibility claim. But he appears to
hold on the idea that the subjectivity of an experience is somehow connected to the
access the subject has to it. We have seen that even without infallibility, the idea is
not suited to provide a coherent account of the subjectivity of experiences.
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